Abstract
Foreign domestic helpers (FDHs) occupy a legally distinctive position within Hong Kong. Their work is regulated by immigration permission, conditions of stay, the Standard Employment Contract, employer and helper undertakings, administrative policy, employment law, and criminal law. These sources do not carry identical legal force.
A contractual obligation is not automatically a condition of stay; a policy requirement is not automatically a criminal prohibition; an employer undertaking may bear heavily on visa eligibility without itself producing a section 41 offence. Conversely, an actual condition of stay may trigger not only administrative consequences but removal powers, lawful-employability consequences, and criminal liability.
This article argues that the source of the obligation must be identified before its consequence is asserted. That methodology resolves recurrent confusion concerning the live-in requirement, outside employment, work for relatives or at other premises, the two-week rule, lawful employability, false representations, permanent residence, and sentencing.
It examines the statutory framework in the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), the Court of Final Appeal’s constitutional analysis in Vallejos Evangeline Banao v Commissioner of Registration, the CFI and CA judgments in Lubiano Nancy Almorin v Director of Immigration, and the sentencing methodology developed in HKSAR v Bodomo, Marissa Flores, HKSAR v Chong Chee-meng, and HKSAR v Lee Ming Ho.
I. Introduction
Public discussion of foreign domestic helpers frequently collapses different legal ideas into one. It is said that an FDH “must live in” because the law says so, that working outside the home is “automatically criminal”, or that seven years of living in Hong Kong produces permanent residency. Each proposition is incomplete unless the legal source of the obligation is first identified.
An FDH is not merely an employee. Nor is an FDH merely an immigration entrant. The helper is admitted under a purpose-specific arrangement in which employment, residence, visa eligibility, immigration control and statutory labour protection intersect. The practical strength of the scheme lies in its interlocking elements; the legal difficulty lies in distinguishing their separate functions.
This article adopts a simple proposition: identify the source of the obligation before identifying the consequence. The source may be: (i) a condition of stay imposed under s 11 of Cap. 115; (ii) a contractual term in Form ID 407; (iii) an undertaking made to the Director; (iv) an administrative policy or eligibility criterion; or (v) an independent statutory offence. The consequence depends on which source is engaged.
II. The FDH Admission Scheme
The FDH scheme is not a general work-visa regime. The Court of Final Appeal in Vallejos described the scheme as one under which the prospective employer applies for an FDH visa; the parties use a standard-form contract; admission is for employment as a domestic helper with the named employer under that contract; the stay is contract-linked; and the system includes restrictive provisions concerning change of employer, home leave, work location and dependants. [1]
An FDH’s permission is therefore tied to a specified relationship, not to a general right to work in Hong Kong. The helper is not a worker available for deployment by an extended family, a business network, a neighbour, a client, or the owner of a second property. The fact that a task is domestic in ordinary language does not establish that it is authorised under the legal arrangement. The relevant question is whether it is domestic work for the named employer and contractual household within the approved employment relationship.
The restrictive scheme is not merely a product of departmental preference. In Vallejos, the CFA recorded its central characteristics: a named employer, a standard two-year contract, a contract-linked period of permission, restrictions on changing employer, a prescribed return-home period before a new contract, residence in the employer’s home, restrictions on working elsewhere, and restrictions on bringing dependants. [2]
III. The Legal Architecture: Five Sources of Obligation
The following categories should not be conflated:
Category
Primary source
Typical legal consequence
Conditions of stay
Immigration Ordinance, s 11; individual permission/visa conditions
Possible refusal or curtailment, removal under s 19, offence under s 41
Contractual obligations
Standard Employment Contract, Form ID 407
Employment/contract remedies and obligations; may record but cannot itself create immigration conditions
Employer/FDH undertakings
Visa application materials and representations to the Director
Relevant to grant, renewal, curtailment and immigration discretion; may carry false-statement consequences if untrue
Administrative policy and guidance
Immigration Department FAQ, guidebooks and practice
Guides discretion and eligibility; does not by itself create a criminal offence
Independent statutory offences
Immigration Ordinance ss 17I, 41, 42; other laws
Criminal liability only if statutory elements are proved
Section 11 supplies the statutory foundation for conditions of stay. When permission to land or remain is granted, an immigration officer or immigration assistant may impose a limit of stay and other conditions of stay authorised by the Director. Separately, the Director may impose further conditions of stay by written notice. The statutory phrase “condition of stay” in ss 19, 17G and 41 must be understood through this machinery. [3]
Section 41 is correspondingly narrow. It criminalises only the contravention of “a condition of stay in force in respect of” the person. It does not in terms criminalise every breach of contract, every departure from an undertaking, or every inconsistency with departmental policy. [4]
Clause 4(c) of Form ID 407 is important but must be read with that hierarchy in mind. It records that the restrictions in Clauses 4(a) and 4(b) — domestic duties only and no other employment — form part of the conditions of stay imposed by the Director. The contract records the immigration significance of those restrictions; it does not itself create a statutory condition of stay. [5]
IV. The Live-In Requirement
Clause 3 of Form ID 407 provides that the helper shall work and reside in the employer’s residence stated in the contract. The Immigration Department’s published FDH materials likewise describe a prevailing policy of full-time live-in domestic service at the employer’s residence. The employer must provide suitable accommodation and reasonable privacy. [6]
The critical legal question is whether the live-in requirement is itself a condition of stay. The answer supplied by the primary judgments in Lubiano is clear.
In the CFI, Anderson Chow J examined the Standard Employment Contract, the FDH visa application, the FDH undertaking and the employer’s undertaking. The Court held that, as between employer and FDH, the live-in requirement is contractual. As between the employer/FDH and the Director, it is a matter of undertaking and an eligibility criterion for the Director’s discretionary decision to permit employment and grant an FDH visa. The requirement is not imposed by the Director on the FDH as a condition of stay. [7]
The CFI then stated the immediate consequence: breach of the undertakings may attract adverse immigration consequences and may potentially engage s 42 false-statement issues where the statutory elements are satisfied, but it does not, merely by reason of such breach, amount to breach-of-condition-of-stay liability under s 41. [8]
The Court of Appeal adopted the same legal characterisation. It stated that the live-in requirement is contractual as between employer and FDH; is an undertaking and eligibility criterion as between the FDH/employer and the Director; and is not imposed by the Director as a condition of stay. At the same time, the CA recognised that it is in substance an immigration-control requirement exercised within the Director’s statutory regime. [9]
The Court of Appeal in Lubiano confirmed that the live-in requirement is not imposed as a statutory “condition of stay” under section 11 of the Immigration Ordinance, but rather operates as a contractual obligation between employer and FDH, and as an undertaking and eligibility criterion for the Director’s exercise of discretion in visa approval. A breach of the live-in requirement does not, by itself, constitute a criminal offence under section 41 of the Immigration Ordinance. The Court further noted that while the Director’s power under section 11 is broad enough to impose such a requirement as a condition of stay, this is not the current practice. The Court of First Instance in Fernandez & Anor v Commissioner of Labour & Anor further considered the operation of the live-in requirement in the context of an FDH’s maternity leave. [10]
The CFI connected the live-in rule to the restrictive FDH scheme considered in Vallejos. It rejected the ultra vires argument: although the rule was not in fact imposed as a condition of stay, the Director’s power under s 11 was sufficiently broad and flexible that such a requirement could lawfully have been imposed as a condition of stay. The Director could also lawfully attain the practical result through contract, undertakings and visa-eligibility criteria. [11]
The CA judgment records the governmental rationale: FDHs are a full-time live-in workforce; the arrangement is linked to labour-market policy and protection of local domestic helpers; stricter enforcement followed the post-2003 policy; and exceptional cases may be considered case by case. It also connects the live-in requirement with the FDH scheme considered in Vallejos. [12]
The legal conclusion is therefore carefully confined. A private live-out arrangement may breach the Standard Employment Contract, depart from employer/FDH undertakings, and undermine visa-eligibility requirements or administrative expectations. It can therefore carry serious administrative consequences, including refusal of an extension or renewal, adverse exercise of discretion, or investigation of any false statement made in immigration documents. But it should not automatically be described as a s 41 offence unless the individual’s actual conditions of stay independently impose and prohibit the relevant conduct.
The live-in requirement does not diminish the employer’s duty to provide adequate accommodation. Official guidance requires suitable accommodation and reasonable privacy. A mattress in a corridor, inappropriate room-sharing, unsafe facilities, or conditions inconsistent with reasonable privacy may therefore be both an employment-law and immigration-administration concern. [13]
V. Outside Employment and Improper Deployment
Outside employment has a different legal profile. Clause 4(b) provides that an FDH shall not take up, and shall not be required by the employer to take up, other employment with any other person. Clause 4(c) records that the restrictions in Clauses 4(a) and 4(b) form part of conditions of stay imposed by the Director. This creates a materially stronger route to s 41 than exists for the live-in requirement.
Unauthorised outside employment should still be analysed in sequence: identify the specific condition of stay; determine whether the proposed work falls within conduct prohibited by it; and then identify the resulting consequences. But where an FDH works for another household, a neighbour, a relative outside the contractual household, a shop, restaurant, office, warehouse, or other business, the case for breach of an actual work-related condition of stay will ordinarily be much stronger than in a simple live-out case.
The same caution applies to routine work at a second property, recurring care at an elderly home or hospital, or deployment by an employer’s family network. Some tasks outside the residence may be genuinely incidental to the household’s daily needs, such as grocery shopping, school collection, or delivering necessities. But deployment to serve another household, another address as a regular arrangement, another business or another individual is different in substance. [14]
Driving is ordinarily excluded unless specific permission is obtained. Even where permission is granted because driving is incidental to domestic duties, that does not convert the FDH into a general chauffeur or authorise all transport work the household may prefer. [15]
VI. Consequences of a Condition-of-Stay Breach
Administrative consequences
Where an actual condition of stay has been breached, the first practical consequences are commonly administrative. The Director may refuse renewal or extension, decline a change-of-employer application, curtail a limit of stay, or take the breach into account when exercising immigration discretion.
Removal
Section 19(1)(b)(ii) permits the Director to make a removal order if a person “is contravening or has contravened a condition of stay in respect of him”. This power is separate from criminal prosecution and may be more immediately significant than sentencing in ordinary immigration practice. [16]
Criminal liability
Section 41 creates the offence of contravening a condition of stay in force in respect of the individual. The maximum penalty is HK$50,000 and two years’ imprisonment. [17]
Employer liability under section 17I of the Immigration Ordinance is a distinct and serious offence. Where an employer employs a person who is not lawfully employable, the maximum penalty is HK$350,000 and three years’ imprisonment, rising to HK$500,000 and ten years’ imprisonment if the employee is a prohibited employee. The statutory defence requires the employer to prove that all practicable steps were taken to determine lawful employability and that it was reasonable to conclude that the person was lawfully employable. The seriousness of employer offending is assessed by reference to the employer’s role, culpability and any aggravating circumstances. [18]
Lawful employability
Section 17G(2) links lawful employability to compliance with immigration conditions. For an identity-card holder, lawful employability includes not having breached a condition of stay. For relevant unregistered persons, it includes lawful landing, no employment prohibition under a condition of stay, and no removal or deportation order. [19]
Section 17I creates employer liability where a person employs someone who is not lawfully employable. The maximum penalty on indictment is HK$350,000 and three years’ imprisonment where the employee is not a prohibited employee, rising to HK$500,000 and ten years’ imprisonment where the employee is a prohibited employee. The statutory defence requires proof that all practicable steps were taken to determine lawful employability and that it was reasonable to conclude the person was lawfully employable. [20]
A valid visa is therefore not enough. The inquiry is specific: may this helper perform this work, for this employer, at this location, under the actual conditions of stay in force?
VI. Termination, the Two-Week Rule and Employment Protection
Termination of an FDH contract has both immigration and employment consequences. A contract may ordinarily be terminated with notice or payment in lieu, but termination does not remove statutory employment entitlements or immigration obligations.
The Immigration Department’s position is that an FDH is normally admitted for two years or until two weeks after termination, whichever is earlier. The actual limit of stay is the date shown in the individual’s e-Visa or landing permission, and should always be checked directly. [21]
A change of employer is not a private transfer. It requires the appropriate immigration process. The death of an employer, a request by relatives, or the fact that the new proposed employer is part of the same family does not itself authorise continued employment by another person.
FDHs remain protected by the Employment Ordinance and the Standard Employment Contract. Rights include wages, rest days, statutory holidays, annual leave, medical treatment in applicable circumstances, maternity protection, termination payments and other employment protections. Immigration vulnerability must not be used to deny wages, induce an unfair settlement, withhold documents, or pressure an FDH to sign an inaccurate statement. [22]
The Minimum Allowable Wage and food allowance are current administrative figures rather than fixed statutory amounts. They must be checked against the official notice in force on the publication or advice date.
VII. Ordinary Residence, Permanent Residence and the Right of Abode
Long physical presence does not automatically create permanent resident status. Article 24(2)(4) requires a non-Chinese person to have entered with valid travel documents, ordinarily resided in Hong Kong continuously for not less than seven years, and taken Hong Kong as a place of permanent residence. Each is an independent element.
Section 2(4)(a)(vi) provides that a person is not treated as ordinarily resident while employed as a domestic helper from outside Hong Kong. [23]
In Vallejos, the CFA addressed the constitutional validity of that exclusion. It set out Article 24(2)(4), section 2(4), and the direct effect of section 2(4)(a)(vi). [24]
The Court of Final Appeal in Vallejos v Commissioner of Registration held that the restrictive features of the FDH scheme—including the live-in requirement, contract-linked stay, and return-home obligations, render FDH residence “qualitatively so far-removed from what would traditionally be recognised as ‘ordinary residence’” that FDHs as a class do not satisfy the ordinary-residence requirement under Article 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law. The Court emphasised that immigration control is a constant feature of eligibility for permanent residence, and that section 2(4)(a)(vi) of the Immigration Ordinance is constitutionally valid. Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen provides further constitutional context on the interpretation of Article 24 and the statutory framework governing right-of-abode claims. [25]
The appellants argued that “ordinarily resided” carried a decisive natural and ordinary meaning derived from Ex parte Shah, so that FDHs who lived lawfully, voluntarily and for a settled purpose necessarily qualified. The Commissioner argued that the restrictive FDH scheme created a qualitatively exceptional form of residence and that constitutional context mattered. [26]
The CFA held that it would be an error to assume that ordinary residence has a single fixed meaning regardless of factual and legal context. Lord Scarman’s formulation was a starting point, not an exhaustive definition. Its analysis of Ex parte Shah demonstrated that immigration status may be irrelevant in one statutory context but highly relevant in another. [27]
The Court held that Article 24(2)(4) itself makes immigration control a constant feature of eligibility: entry with valid travel documents, continuing permission, limits of stay, and other controls are built into the seven-year route. [28]
The restrictive FDH features, named-employer service, standard contractual arrangements, residence at the employer’s home, no outside employment, return-home requirements, non-settlement purpose, and restrictions on dependants, rendered FDH residence “qualitatively so far-removed from what would traditionally be recognised as ‘ordinary residence’” that FDHs as a class did not fall within the relevant Article 24(2)(4) concept. Section 2(4)(a)(vi) was therefore constitutionally valid. [29]
The Court did not need to decide the alternative legislative-margin argument, did not need extrinsic materials, and rejected an Article 158 reference because the necessity condition was not met. [30]
The decision does not deny FDHs employment rights, render valid FDH presence unlawful, or foreclose every possible separate immigration route. It decides the ordinary-residence character of time spent under the specified FDH scheme for the Article 24(2)(4) route.
IX. False Statements and Immigration Integrity
Section 42 addresses false statements and representations to immigration officers and false information in immigration documents. On conviction on indictment, the maximum penalty is HK$150,000 and fourteen years’ imprisonment. [31]
No person should submit a false contract, invent a residence arrangement, conceal the actual recipient of the FDH’s work, fabricate wage information, or pressure a helper to sign an inaccurate immigration declaration. The issue is not merely administrative. False material may engage serious statutory consequences and affect future immigration discretion.
X. Sentencing: Methodology, Proof and Proportionality
Sentencing remains individualised. However, three verified authorities supply structured guidance relevant to FDH-related immigration offending: Bodomo on a confined category of false-employment information cases; Chong Chee-meng on proof of disputed aggravation; and Lee Ming Ho on double counting, role/culpability and totality.
False employment information: Bodomo
In HKSAR v Bodomo, Marissa Flores, the appellant was an FDH who used bogus employment contracts and false employment arrangements to make repeated false representations to Immigration officers, obtain extensions of stay, and obtain a Hong Kong identity card. The Court distinguished this category from cases involving forged passports, forged travel documents or international document fraud. [32]
The Court of Appeal in HKSAR v Bodomo, Marissa Flores distinguished false-employment-information cases from cases involving forged passports, forged travel documents, or international document fraud, setting a six-month starting point before plea for the former confined category. In HKSAR v De Gracia, Maria Erla Tabasa, HCMA 621/2013, McWalters J, 5 December 2013, the Court emphasised that immigration offences involving inaccurate identity information engage important public-policy considerations because immigration authorities rely upon the accuracy of travel documents and identifying particulars. The Court nevertheless accepted that unusual factual circumstances may justify an individualised sentencing approach outside ordinary tariff analysis. [33]
For FDH-type false-employment information offending not involving forged travel documents, the Court endorsed a six-month starting point before plea and held that four months after plea was appropriate. This is confined guidance for that category of immigration deception; it is not a universal tariff for every offence under s 42. [34]
Proof of disputed aggravation: Chong Chee-meng
An offender should not be sentenced on the basis of disputed aggravating facts that have not been admitted or properly proved. In HKSAR v Chong Chee-meng, the Court of Appeal held that where factual disputes are relevant to or closely bound up with ingredients of an offence, a Newton hearing may be required and the prosecution must establish its version to the criminal standard. [35]
The Court’s analysis confirms that, where the prosecution seeks to rely on disputed facts in aggravation, those facts must be established on the criminal onus and standard of proof. The position differs where the defence advances an extraneous factual matter in mitigation: the defence may then bear the burden of establishing that mitigating matter, ordinarily on the balance of probabilities. [36]
Double counting and totality: Lee Ming Ho
The sentencing court must also avoid double counting. In HKSAR v Lee Ming Ho, the Court of Appeal warned against the risk that features already reflected in the assessment of an offender’s role and culpability would later be treated as separate aggravating enhancements. The authority arose in large-scale dangerous-drug trafficking and should be used here as a general sentencing-methodology authority, not as an immigration-offence comparator or a tariff authority. [37]
The Court explained that factors such as an international element, mastermind or senior-player status, and use of young persons would ordinarily be treated as matters bearing on role and culpability when identifying the starting point, rather than mechanically as independent uplifts. If a judge treats a factor separately as aggravation, the reasoning should explain why separate treatment is justified and avoid overlap. [38]
The Court also reaffirmed totality: sentencing cannot proceed by simply adding up aggravating factors. The final result must remain fair, balanced and just, and courts must guard against inflation caused by multiple counts or overlapping aggravating features. [39]
Applied to FDH-related immigration offending, the principle means that one factual arrangement should not be repeatedly enhanced under different labels without a principled basis. If false contracts are already reflected in an assessment of planning and culpability, they should not ordinarily be reused as separate enhancement merely because they also evidence deception or sophistication, unless the additional feature has genuine independent aggravating significance. This is an application of the general methodology, not a direct holding of Lee Ming Ho in an immigration case.
XI. Practical Compliance Checklist
· Keep the Standard Employment Contract, Schedule of Accommodation and Domestic Duties, e-Visa/landing record, wage records and termination documents.
· Check the actual limit of stay shown on the individual e-Visa or landing permission.
· Do not treat a relative, neighbour, business or second household as automatically within the approved employment arrangement.
· Before arranging work outside the contractual household, identify the actual condition of stay, not merely the contractual wording or an informal assurance.
· Treat outside employment for another person as a high-risk issue, since it ordinarily has the strongest connection to actual conditions of stay.
· Treat live-out arrangements as serious contract, undertaking and immigration-policy issues; do not automatically characterise them as s 41 offences without checking the actual condition of stay.
· Where a contract ends, record the termination date, notify Immigration as required, calculate final employment entitlements and check the precise immigration deadline.
· Before publication or advice, verify current Form ID 407, ID 911A, official Immigration and Labour Department materials, the Minimum Allowable Wage and food allowance.
Conclusion
FDHs in Hong Kong are neither ordinary employees with unrestricted work rights nor persons without legal protection. Their position is governed by a structured interaction of statute, actual conditions of stay, contract, employer undertaking and administrative policy. The central methodological rule is simple: identify the source of the obligation before identifying the consequence.
That approach prevents recurring errors. A contractual requirement is not automatically a condition of stay. A policy requirement is not automatically a criminal prohibition. An undertaking may have serious visa and discretionary consequences without itself carrying the same legal effect as a condition imposed under s 11. Conversely, a restriction genuinely incorporated into an individual’s condition of stay may affect not only s 41 liability but removal under s 19 and lawful employability under ss 17G and 17I.
The same discipline applies to permanent residence. Time spent physically and lawfully in Hong Kong as an FDH does not automatically amount to ordinary residence for Article 24(2)(4). Vallejos establishes that residence under the restrictive FDH scheme considered by the Court is qualitatively outside the relevant ordinary-residence concept. Employment rights, immigration status, permanent-residence rights, and criminal consequences must therefore be analysed separately rather than collapsed into a single question of time spent in Hong Kong.
The legal consequences of an FDH arrangement depend on the source of the relevant obligation and the facts of the particular case. Conditions of stay, contractual terms, undertakings, administrative requirements and statutory offences carry different consequences. Employers, FDHs, agents and advisers should therefore identify the applicable legal source, the actual conditions of stay in force and the relevant statutory requirements before drawing conclusions about immigration, employment, administrative or criminal liability.
Bibliography
1. Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, arts 24, 31 and 158.
2. Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), especially ss 2(4)(a)(vi), 11, 17G, 17I, 19, 41 and 42.
3. Standard Employment Contract and Terms of Employment for Helpers, Form ID 407.
4. Immigration Department, “Foreign Domestic Helpers”.
5. Immigration Department, “Foreign Domestic Helpers: Frequently Asked Questions”.
6. Labour Department, Practical Guide for Employment of Foreign Domestic Helpers.
7. Vallejos Evangeline Banao v Commissioner of Registration and another (2013) 16 HKCFAR 45, FACV Nos 19 & 20 of 2012.
8. Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211.
9. Lubiano Nancy Almorin v The Director of Immigration, HCAL 210/2016; [2018] HKCFI 331; [2018] 1 HKLRD 1141.
10. Lubiano Nancy Almorin v Director of Immigration, CACV 112/2018; [2020] HKCA 782; [2020] 5 HKLRD 107.
11. Fernandez Yvette Dingle and Fernandez Eloisa Valerie, suing by her next friend Yvette Dingle Fernandez v Commissioner of Labour and another, HCAL 3215/2019 (CFI).
12. HKSAR v Bodomo, Marissa Flores [2005] 4 HKLRD 285, HCMA 343/2005.
13. HKSAR v De Gracia, Maria Erla Tabasa, HCMA 621/2013, McWalters J, 5 December 2013.
14. HKSAR v Chong Chee-meng, CACC No 315 of 2007 (CA, 21 October 2008).
15. HKSAR v Lee Ming Ho, CACC No 130 of 2019; [2024] HKCA 150.
16. I Cross and P S Cheung, Sentencing in Hong Kong (10th edn, LexisNexis Hong Kong 2023).
Citation Notes
1. Vallejos Evangeline Banao v Commissioner of Registration and another (2013) 16 HKCFAR 45, FACV Nos 19 & 20 of 2012, [7]–[16].
2. Vallejos (n 1) [8]–[16].
3. Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), s 11(2), (5).
4. Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), s 41.
5. Standard Employment Contract and Terms of Employment for Helpers (Form ID 407), cll 4(a)–(c); Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), s 11.
6. Immigration Department, “Foreign Domestic Helpers”; Immigration Department, “Foreign Domestic Helpers: Frequently Asked Questions”; Labour Department, Practical Guide for Employment of Foreign Domestic Helpers; Standard Employment Contract, Form ID 407, cl 3.
7. Lubiano Nancy Almorin v The Director of Immigration, HCAL 210/2016; [2018] HKCFI 331; [2018] 1 HKLRD 1141, [12].
8. Lubiano, HCAL 210/2016, [13].
9. Lubiano Nancy Almorin v Director of Immigration, CACV 112/2018; [2020] HKCA 782; [2020] 5 HKLRD 107, [22].
10. Lubiano CA, CACV 112/2018, [22], [24]; Fernandez Yvette Dingle and Fernandez Eloisa Valerie, suing by her next friend Yvette Dingle Fernandez v Commissioner of Labour and another, HCAL 3215/2019 (CFI).
11. Lubiano, HCAL 210/2016, [41]–[53].
12. Lubiano CA, CACV 112/2018, [12]–[20], [42].
13. Immigration Department, “Foreign Domestic Helpers: Frequently Asked Questions”; Labour Department, Practical Guide for Employment of Foreign Domestic Helpers.
14. Immigration Department, “Foreign Domestic Helpers: Frequently Asked Questions”.
15. Immigration Department, “Foreign Domestic Helpers: Frequently Asked Questions”.
16. Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), s 19(1)(b)(ii).
17. Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), s 41.
18. Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), ss 17G and 17I.
19. Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), s 17G(2).
20. Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), s 17I(1), (1A), (7).
21. Immigration Department, “Foreign Domestic Helpers”; Immigration Department, “Foreign Domestic Helpers: Frequently Asked Questions”.
22. Labour Department, Practical Guide for Employment of Foreign Domestic Helpers; Immigration Department, “Foreign Domestic Helpers”.
23. Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), s 2(4)(a)(vi).
24. Vallejos (n 1) [2]–[5].
25. Vallejos (n 1) [83]–[89]; Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211.
26. Vallejos (n 1) [20]–[25].
27. Vallejos (n 1) [27]–[29], [49]–[67].
28. Vallejos (n 1) [83]–[87].
29. Vallejos (n 1) [88]–[89].
30. Vallejos (n 1) [90]–[91], [109]–[113].
31. Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), s 42.
32. HKSAR v Bodomo, Marissa Flores [2005] 4 HKLRD 285, HCMA 343/2005.
33. HKSAR v Bodomo, Marissa Flores [2005] 4 HKLRD 285, HCMA 343/2005; HKSAR v De Gracia, Maria Erla Tabasa, HCMA 621/2013, Mcwalters J, 5 December 2013.
34. Bodomo (n 32) [18]–[19].
35. HKSAR v Chong Chee-meng, CACC No 315 of 2007 (CA, 21 October 2008) [19].
36. Chong Chee-meng (n 35) [22]–[28], [29]–[53].
37. HKSAR v Lee Ming Ho, CACC No 130 of 2019, [2024] HKCA 150, [52]–[55], [63]–[64].
38. Lee Ming Ho (n 37) [52]–[55], [69]–[78].
39. Lee Ming Ho (n 37) [82]–[85].
Disclaimer:
This post is provided for general information only. It reflects Hong Kong law and administrative materials considered as at the date of publication and is not legal advice. It does not create a solicitor-client relationship. The legal consequences of any matter depend on its particular facts, the relevant conditions of stay, current administrative requirements, and applicable law. Specific legal advice should be obtained before taking action.